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ABSTRACT 
China’s surging economy, increasingly urbanised population, and role as the ‘world’s 
factory’, has resulted in energy demand doubling every decade, and it overtaking the 
U.S. this year to become the largest consumer of energy worldwide. At 66%, the 
majority of that energy comes from coal, with the consequences of pollution and GHG 
emissions. In response, China’s government made renewable energy a national priority 
in 2005 with a target of 15% renewables by 2020, and introduced a raft of supporting 
legislation. Progress towards this goal has been impressive and in 2009 China leads in 
solar hot water, is second in wind power, and dominates wind turbine and PV 
manufacturing. However, the reaction of some in the U.S. has been to characterise this 
as a race between the two countries, with the stakes being green jobs, energy security, 
and even global economic leadership.  Using this analogy of a race as a framework for 
my analysis, I look at the real positions of China and the U.S. in the deployment and 
manufacturing of renewables, and their capabilities in the areas of innovation, funding, 
and policy. With the help of a SWOT analysis I find that China is indeed making 
impressive progress in renewables compared to the U.S., and that this can be attributed 
to their ‘comparative advantage’ in manufacturing and effective government, versus 
America’s more dysfunctional approach. I go on to argue that renewable energy is in 
fact a positive sum game, and portraying it as a race distracts from the potential 
benefits of cooperation, and doing it regardless. Finally, renewable energy is placed in 
the broader geo-political context, and is shown to be of both strategic and ideological 
importance to the wider ambitions of the two nations.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
“There is no other road for China except the road to sustainable development”  
Zhenhua Xie, quoted in Time Magazine (Zhenhua 2008) 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
For thousands of years China was essentially self-sufficient in providing for the needs 
of its population and economy from within its own borders, indeed Hsiung (2002) 
suggests this is one of the reasons it stayed isolationist, as there wasn’t anything it 
needed from the rest of the world. Naughton  (2007) describes how 90% of the 
population was rural, and the largely agrarian economy revolved around a sustainable 
form of agriculture that depended on high inputs of labour and resource recycling, and 
what energy was required was supplied by sustainable forms of traditional biomass. 
The world, however, faces a very different China today. It is the most populous nation 
at 1.3 billion and 20% of the world total (Li and Ma 2009), and increasingly urbanised 
as 46% now live in cities (China Popin 2009). It has become the ‘world’s factory’, with 
64% of its GDP trade related (Brandt and Rawski 2008)and makes one third of the 
world’s consumer electronics, and a quarter of its white goods(Shenkar 2006). In 2009 
it surpassed the U.S. to become the world’s largest car market, with 50 million vehicles 
now on the roads (Wu 2009), and with a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$4.4 
trillion it is the world’s third largest economy, overtaking Germany in 2007, and 
expected to overtake the U.S. to be number one sometime around the middle of this 
century (Sommerville 2006). 
China started on this path to industrialisation in 1949 because of what Lee describes as 
the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) determination to build a massive “socialist 
industrial complex”, so that China would never again succumb to the incursions and  
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humiliations it suffered at the hands of industrialised nations like Japan, the U.S., and 
the European colonialist powers at the beginning of the 20th century (Lee 2009). But 
the path to being an industrial power has come at a cost. China’s industrial mix is 
skewed towards energy intensive manufacturing of iron & steel, aluminium, cement, 
and glass, to provide the infrastructure to support its economic growth and rapid 
urbanisation (Hui Ren 2007), and as Martinot and Li (2007) point out that, “China is not 
only meeting the rapidly growing needs of its own people for services like 
transportation, refrigeration, and hot water; it is also serving as factory to the world, 
using large amounts of energy to make goods that are consumed abroad.”  
As a result, energy consumption in China is currently doubling every decade (Martinot 
and Li 2007), and China passed an important watershed, and the U.S. in 2010 to 
become the world’s largest consumer of energy (International Energy Agency 2010). It 
is natural to question the sustainability of this trajectory. If it continues on its current 
path and attains a per capita energy consumption similar to developed countries like 
Japan and Germany, China alone would consume over half the world’s energy supplies 
(Berrah, Feng et al. 2007). 
  
Fig. 1 Steel Mills in Benxi, one of China’s most polluted cities (Photo: Li Junfeng) 
But it’s not just the size and rate of growth of China’s demand for energy that is of 
concern. China is predominantly a coal based economy.  At 66%, it is the backbone of  
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China’s energy supply (International Energy Agency 2010),and the equivalent of two 
600MW coal fired power stations are added each week (Martinot and Li 2007). This 
causes domestic issues of pollution. The World Bank estimates pollution costs China 8-
10% of its GDP, and the World Health Organisation (WHO) says seven of the ten 
world’s most polluted cities are in China (Butler 2005). As Fig. 2 shows, China’s reliance 
on that most polluting of fuels has also propelled it to the number one position in global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since 2007 (McKinsey & Company 2009), with the 
result that it is becoming increasingly clear that, “... stopping global warming is a battle 
which cannot be won without China’s participation” (Wang, Yin et al. 2009) 
 
Fig. 2 Largest GHG emitters in 2007 (McKinsey & Company 2009) 
There seems little prospect that China’s voracious appetite for energy will stop growing 
any time soon, because as Lee (2009) explains, the CCP’s legitimacy is predicated on 
continued economic growth bringing prosperity to the masses. Indeed, the target of 
quadrupling GDP between 2000 and 2020 in order to build “Xiaokang” or a well off 
society, is now ensconced in policy (The Climate Group 2009). This leaves the CCP with 
only two possible solutions to its energy issues – decrease energy intensity or find less 
carbon intensive sources of production (Wang, Yin et al. 2009). It is already tackling the  
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first of these through the Energy Conservation Law and an aggressive target of 
reducing energy intensity by 20% between 2005 and 2010 (Wu 2009). However, 
despite shutting  down more than two thousand inefficient steel and cement mills this 
year alone (Associated Press Correspondents in China 2009), the problem has proved 
more intractable than expected, and energy intensity unexpectedly rose by 3% in the 
first half of 2010 in a perverse reaction to the ‘green’ stimulus package (Johnson 2010). 
Figure 3 shows that coal is expected to remain the dominant form of energy through to 
the middle of this century , although proportionally it is forecast to drop slightly to 53% 
(Asian Development Bank 2009). Finding ways to make its use more efficient and less 
polluting must be a priority, and the government is already closing smaller and older 
power stations, and replacing them with more modern supercritical and ultra-
supercritical units, and is also looking at the technologies of gasification, liquefaction, 
and carbon capture and storage (Ni 2009).  
 
Fig. 3 Growth in China energy supply 1990-2030, where NRE= renewable energy (Asian 
Development Bank 2009)  
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Gas is expected to play an increasing role in de-carbonising China’s energy supply 
(International Energy Agency 2010), and also nuclear power - China has twenty four 
nuclear power plants under construction, and plans for a tenfold increase between now 
and the middle of the century (World Nuclear Association 2010). 
Then, of course, there are the renewable energies, which will be the focus of the rest of 
this report. In 2004 China surprised the world by announcing an ambitious target of 
10% renewable energy by 2010 and 15% by 2020 (Martinot and Li 2008). In fact it met 
its 2010 target two years early, and is in the process of revising the 2020 one upwards 
(Martinot and Li 2010). Then in 2009 it overtook the traditional leaders in advanced 
renewable technology - Europe, the U.S. and Japan – to become the world’s largest 
manufacturer of solar panels and wind turbines (Bradsher 2010). This has been 
greeted with a mixture of awe and alarm by industrialised nations, who according to 
the HSBC report titled ‘A Climate for Recovery: The colour of stimulus goes green’, were 
hoping to re-vitalize their economies after the global financial crisis (GFC) by funnelling 
a “sizeable proportion” of their stimulus packages into creating green jobs and new 
export industries. (Robbins, Clover et al. 2009) 
Each country has reacted differently to China’s rapid rise in renewable energy. Some in 
Europe have seen it as an opportunity to provide equipment and expertise (REN21 
2010), others such as Japan and South Korea have welcomed the opportunity to 
collaborate with China to build Asian capacity in renewable energy (Bacani 2009), but a 
very vocal section in the U.S. has chosen to characterise it as a competition, or race, 
between China and the U.S. for supremacy in renewable energy, as demonstrated by the 
collection of headlines in fig. 4.  
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Fig. 4 Headlines describing a renewable energy race between China and the U.S. 
Henry Kissinger (2005) suggests that behind this rhetoric are existing fears and 
mistrust of China in the areas of trade imbalance, military build-up, and exchange rates, 
and now America is adding another one – energy security, 
“[China’s] efforts to dominate renewable energy technologies raise the prospect 
that the West will someday trade its dependence on oil from the Mideast for a 
reliance on solar panels, wind turbines and other gear manufactured in China” 
(Bradsher 2010) 
However, by characterising it as a race, there is a danger that the true facts and 
complexity of the situation will be lost behind scaremongering and nationalistic 
rhetoric. The prospect of China and America competing in renewable energy is an 
important issue that should concern the rest of the world, so it deserves serious debate 
based on the facts and objective observation – and that is the main purpose of this 
dissertation. 
 
“China leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy” – New York Times, Jan 31st 2010. 
(Bradsher 2010) 
 
“Can the US keep up in the clean energy race?” – National Journal, Energy & 
Environment, Aug 2nd 2010. (McDonald 2007; Harder 2010) 
 
“Running for first in the clean energy race, America & China” – China Clean Energy 
Network, 29
th Jan 2010. (China Clean Energy Network 2010) 
 
“Energy ministers meet in US to discuss clean energy: Who will be in the 
clean energy race?” – Natural Resources Defense Council, July 19th 2010. (Schmidt 
2010) 
 
“Who’s winning the clean energy race? Growth, Competition and Opportunity in the 
World’s Largest Economies” – The PEW Environment Group, 2010. (PEW Group 2010) 
 
“A Race Everybody Wins: China, Japan and South Korea team up to challenge America for 
green-tech supremacy” Time Magazine, 20
th July 2009. (Bacani 2009) 
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1.2  RESEARCH METHODS AND QUESTIONS 
Due to the socio-political nature of the topic, my overall approach to the issue will be 
inductive rather than deductive, following the premise that, “... arguments based on 
experience or observation are best expressed inductively, while arguments based on 
laws, rules, or other widely accepted principles are best expressed deductively” (Naked 
Science Society 2008). 
The title of this dissertation - Is China winning the renewable energy race? - is 
deliberately polemic. However, it provides a working hypothesis for critical analysis of 
the real issues behind the headlines. The intent is to test the hypothesis with 
observations and data, i.e. a hypothetico-deductive approach. In doing so, more specific 
research questions will be raised:- 
Who is ahead in renewable energy – China or the U.S.? The first step is to look at the 
real status of both countries across the metrics of renewables capacity, manufacturing 
industry, and trends over time. This requires collecting accurate and reliable data, as 
current as possible as the situation is changing rapidly, and analysing it using tables, 
graphs and charts to highlight the trends and make comparisons between China and 
the U.S.. In this, the reliability of data from China can be a concern – see box 1. 
Why the different capabilities in renewable energy? The second step is to 
understand what is different about their approaches and capabilities that can explain 
their relative positions as identified above. This requires a literature search across a 
broad range of policy, economic, government and NGO publications, concentrating on 
what the literature points to as the three ‘levers’ a country needs to control to be 
successful in renewable energy – policy, innovation, and funding.   
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Is characterising it as a race correct or even useful, what strategies have been 
successful and unsuccessful, and what are the broader geo-political 
ramifications? These questions will be tackled in the discussion section of the report. 
In order to assist with my interpretation of the results a strategic business planning 
tool called SWOT analysis will be employed, which helps highlight the Strengths, 
Box 1 - The reliability of energy statistics in China 
Chinese energy statistics are often criticised, and justifiably so, as there is definitely a weak system of 
tracking energy in the economy, and a legacy of the control economy to make the figures fit what the 
government wants to hear. Since 1982 there has been a separate office within the Chinese National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) to survey and compile energy statistics, but there were only four people 
assigned  to  this  important  task.  As  a  result  the  statistics  tended  to  concentrate  on  state  owned 
enterprises where information was more readily available, with the growing private sector left to 
estimations. They also didn’t conform to internationally recognised definitions and categorizations, 
making comparisons difficult.  
 
The issue came to a head during the late 1990s to early 2000s when a central government edict went 
out to provinces to close down inefficient and unsafe small coal mines. However, local economies 
were heavily reliant on their output so instead of shutting them down the local officials just stopped 
reporting their output. Coal being such a substantial proportion of the total energy supply meant a 
significant underreporting of Chinese energy supply for a number of years. However, whilst energy 
supply  had  supposedly  declined  by  20%  over  the  period,  all  other  indicators  of  energy  use  and 
economic production remained on track – GDP, for example, increased 36% over the same period. 
The  figures  for  coal  production  were  eventually  revised  upwards  by  30%  (Naughton  2007). 
Considering the importance of energy to economic growth and therefore political stability, the CCP 
realised it had overhaul the system of energy statistics, and in 2005 the ‘Implementation Decree for 
the Statistics Law’ gave the NBS a wider remit and greater powers to collect data across state and 
private enterprises (Berrah, Feng et al. 2007). 
 
Since then, those close to China suggest they are trying hard to be honest and open with data, but still 
have problems collecting it (Martinot and Li 2008). Lee points out that, “China’s 45 million local 
officials  remain  the  most  formidable  obstacle  to  improving  transparency  in  China’s  sprawling 
economy.” (Lee 2008). At a meeting in Beijing this year the U.S. and China recognised the importance 
of reliable and comparable data to both countries, and resolved to cooperate on the collection of 
energy data, forecasting, and analysis of information in the future (The Green Leap Forward 2010). 
The figures I have used in this report are not direct from government sources, but are second hand 
from  trusted  international  sources  such  as  the  IEA  or  World  Bank,  who  have  already  done  the 
verification and  conversion process,  so  that  we  can  be  reasonably  confident  in  our  comparisons. 
When the source is a lesser one, I have verified the numbers across multiple trusted sources. 
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Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats to each country in terms of its renewable 
energy position. Further details on the methodology of SWOT analysis appears in 
Appendix 1. 
Finally, conclusions will be drawn, and commentary made on the degree to which the 
research was successful (or otherwise) in achieving its purpose, with suggestions made 
for potential areas of further study.  
1.3  SCOPE 
The scope of this report is deliberately limited to a consideration of only China and the 
U.S.. It is accepted that there is much going on in the rest of the world, such as the prior 
lead that Europe has shown in renewables, considerable manufacturing efforts in other 
Asian nations like Japan and South Korea, and the rapidly rising influence of India on 
the renewable energy scene. However, limitations of time and length preclude their 
inclusion. Similarly, renewable energy encompasses a broad range of technologies and 
industries, but in keeping with my theme, I will concentrate on those where China and 
the U.S. are competing around technology in the international arena. This means I won’t 
consider rural/off grid renewables in China, particularly as these are of decreasing 
importance, as its rural electrification scheme has been so successful that less than 4 
million household remain without electricity, and the emphasis now is moving towards 
large scale, grid connected power solutions (Martinot and Li 2007). 
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2  THE FACTS ABOUT RENEWABLE ENERGY CAPABILITIES 
”China is a poor country with nothing comparable to the tremendous research, 
industrial and economic resources that the U.S. has been blessed with. Yet they’re 
blowing us away. The low carbon era is coming. We can be dragged into that 
newer, greener world by countries like China; or we can take up the challenge and 
become the world’s leader ourselves.”  Bob Herbert in the New York Times (Herbert 
2010)   
In the course of this chapter we will compare the true capabilities of China and the U.S. 
in renewables. There are two distinct facets to explore - use of renewables in a 
country’s energy supply, and manufacturing capacity in its economy, with the 
difference between the two being filled by imports and exports. It is important to make 
the distinction because they do not always go together, and have different benefits for 
the host country – use confers the benefits of a lower carbon intensity, reduced 
pollution, and security of energy supply; whilst manufacturing supports green jobs and 
has potential balance of trade benefits. 
2.1  OVERALL ENERGY SUPPLY MIX 
Looking at the breakdown of primary energy supply in fig. 5 we see that both China and 
the U.S. are still predominantly  fossil fuel based economies - 85.6% in the case of the 
U.S. and 86.9% for China, and both above the world average of 81.4% (International 
Energy Agency 2010). Of the remaining non-fossil fuel energy supplies in the U.S., 
nuclear is the largest contributor at 9%, and renewables a minor share at 5%. China has 
a similar overall proportion of non-fossil fuel supplies, but nuclear currently 
contributes less than one percent, so the majority is in renewables. Therefore, China 
has more than double the proportion of renewables in its energy supply than the U.S. -  
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12.7% versus 5%., and in absolute terms is also the largest user of renewable energy 
worldwide (REN21 2010). 
 
Fig. 5 U.S. and China share of primary energy supply (Compiled from various sources - see 
appendix 2) 
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Looking within the breakdown of renewables capacity for each country we see that the 
U.S. has a broader diversity of sources than China, with its strengths lying in hydro, 
traditional biomass, biofuels and wind, in that order. Meanwhile, China’s leading 
position in the use of renewables is almost entirely due to just three sectors – 
traditional biomass, hydro, and solar hot water (Solar HW). 
So, the first observation to make is that despite the disproportionate focus of politicians 
and press on wind power and photovoltaics (PV), 74% of total renewables capacity for 
China, and slightly less at 71% for the U.S. are actually in the low-tech 1st generation 
technologies, see fig 6. 
 
Fig. 6 U.S. & China renewable energy mix by generation. See appendix 3 for definition (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration 2009) 
2.2  FIRST GENERATION RENEWABLES 
Biomass: Biomass in the U.S. is a combination of firewood for stoves/grates, and use of 
by-products of the pulp and paper industry in Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants. 
The former is in decline as newer technologies replace stoves and fireplaces in the 
home, whilst the latter is already at a high penetration with little room to grow (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration 2009). In contrast, China is still growing in biomass 
1st Gen 
71% 
2nd Gen 
29% 
3rd Gen 
<1% 
U.S. - RE Mix by 
Generation 
1st Gen 
74% 
2nd Gen 
26% 
3rd Gen 
0% 
China - RE Mix by 
Generation  
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– both in terms of the percentage of the resource utilised, and in the efficiency of 
utilisation through the application of new technology. Traditional wood and straw 
burning is an important energy source in rural areas for heating, hot water, cooking, 
and small scale industries, contributing 76% of rural energy supply (Ma, Oxley et al. 
2009).  According  to Larson, Zongxin et al. (2003) there is potential for wide scale 
application of advanced biomass technology in China, and as much as 500 million tons a 
year could be available for power generation. The government has already 
experimented with small scale managed forestry biomass and gasification of straw 
waste (Berrah, Feng et al. 2007). The 25MW biomass power plant pictured in fig. 7 
burns 200,000 tons of crop residues and tree branches annually (Martinot and Li 
2007). 
 
Fig.7 Biomass plant in Jinzhou, Hebei province.(Photo: Li Junfeng) 
Hydropower: In hydropower, the US faces a similar dilemma to other developed 
countries – that most of the economically feasible resources have already been 
exploited, as well as political and environmental considerations that prevent expansion 
(U.S. Energy Information Administration 2010). Accordingly, there are no new 
hydropower projects currently planned in the US, and only small growth is expected 
through re-powering and upgrading of existing facilities (OECD/IEA 2004). China, in 
contrast, is experiencing the largest growth of any country, nearly doubling its capacity  
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between 2004-2009 (REN21 2010), including 18GW from the Three Gorges Project 
alone. Moreover, a recent study suggests that China has still only exploited 25% of its 
available hydropower resources (Yang 2007).  
Biogas: Biogas is another area where China has the lead over the U.S.,  and in fact it is 
the leader in use of biogas worldwide with more than 20 million small household scale 
bio-digesters installed in rural homes since the 1950s, and approximately 1,600 
industrial scale biogas plants using animal and crop wastes to generate between 10-
100 kW of power (Martinot and Li 2007).  
Geothermal: The U.S. leads world installed geothermal capacity at 3.1GW, and is 
growing – six new plants came online in 2009, increasing capacity by 6%, and another 
200 projects underway (REN21 2010). China, meanwhile, has limited resources 
concentrated in Tibet and Yunnan Province, which so far have been little exploited.  
Both countries are exploiting low grade geothermal resources through ground source 
heat pumps. In China , use of GSHP for space heating and hot water is growing rapidly 
at 10% per annum (REN21 2009), and the current capacity is 9GWth, compared to 
13GWth in the US (Lund, Freeston et al. 2010). 
 
Fig. 8 China renewable energy targets (Martinot and Li 2007)  
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So, in 1st generation renewables China is both starting from a larger base than the U.S., 
and has greater capacity to grow. Fig. 8 shows China’s aggressive growth targets for all 
its traditional renewable energy resources over the next decade, versus Fig. 9 which 
shows them declining in the U.S.. 
 
Fig. 9 U.S. renewable energy mix over time (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2009) 
2.3  SECOND GENERATION RENEWABLES 
Biofuels: Although a small proportion of a country’s primary energy supply, biofuels 
are a very important area as they are a substitute for reliance on imported oil for 
transportation fuel. In 2009 the U.S. produced 43 billion litres of biofuels, which is 
slightly more than 50% of global production, versus China’s 2.5 billion litres (REN21 
2010). However, first generation biofuels i.e. ethanol from corn and sugar cane, and 
biodiesel from vegetable oils, have faced a number of challenges recently, including 
unfavourable market conditions in the form of high corn prices and low oil prices, and 
fundamental doubts about the sustainability credentials of biofuels (REN21 2010). The 
latter revolves around competition with food crops/arable land, biodiversity impacts, 
and the lifecycle carbon emissions of biofuels compared to their fossil fuel substitutes. 
These concerns have led to consolidation in the US market, and after stimulating the  
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biofuel market in 2005, China backtracked in 2007 by announcing a halt to expansion 
of corn based ethanol (Xu 2006). In both countries the emphasis has shifted to 
advanced biofuels based on non food crops, cellulosic ethanol,  or algae based 
processes, and alternative low carbon vehicle technologies like compressed natural gas 
(CNG), battery electric vehicles (BEVs), and fuel cells, and it is in these areas where the 
real competition will be in the future - see box 2 on EVs. 
Wind. At 35GW, the U.S. is currently the leader in installed wind power, was the fastest 
growing market from 2004-2008, and grew by 10GW or 40% in 2009 – see fig. 10 
(Lacey 2010). Impressive as this is, China has doubled its capacity for the last five years 
running, installed 13.8GW in 2009, and overtook Germany to become number two in 
installed capacity behind the U.S. (Atkinson, Shellenberger et al. 2009).  
 
Fig. 10 U.S. & China growth in wind capacity (Adapted from US DOE (2010) & REN21 (2009)) 
As we will explore in section 3.2, the GFC and regulatory paralysis in the U.S. has 
reduced funding for new projects such that the U.S. is expected to add only about  5-
7GW of new wind capacity in 2010, allowing China to take the position of largest 
installed capacity by the end of this year (Lacey 2010). Being beaten by China at one of 
its strengths has great symbolic significance for the U.S, and the symbolism of its iconic 
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wind farms isn’t lost on the Chinese either. Even though they currently only contribute 
0.5% of energy supply, the impressive forests of turbines demonstrate China’s 
seriousness about renewable energy and a low carbon future, and are harbinger of 
what China can achieve in other RE technologies in the future, if it sets its mind to it. 
Meanwhile, with a recent UN resource assessment sizing the wind potential in China at 
3,000GW (UNEP 2006), they are unlikely to hit capacity restrictions any time soon. 
Indeed, China is expected to continue to add new capacity at a rate of about 10GW per 
annum (Schwartz 2009), much in the form of a few so called “wind mega-projects” 
which expect to contribute 100GW of capacity from just six projects by 2020. This 
optimism has resulted in the government’s 2020 target recently being revised upwards 
to 120GW, from its original 30GW, set in 2007 (Martinot and Li 2010). 
 
Fig. 11 China wind resources (Ni 2009) 
There are issues that need to be overcome, of course. In the beginning many wind 
farms were built in the best resource areas in the deserts and plains of the northwest 
provinces and Inner Mongolia (Pellman 2010) – see fig. 11. However, the bulk of 
demand comes from the coastal population and industrial centres in the east, and so  
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with local utilities lacking an incentive to connect wind farms to the grid, and high 
transmission losses for those that are connected, it has been reported that in 2007 as 
little as 10% of the installed wind capacity found its way to consumers (Schwartz 
2009). As a result more recent projects have been located closer to demand in eastern 
coastal cities like Shanghai and Guangdong, but this  brings problems of its own -  land 
is in short supply and more expensive, and the resource less, which can impact on the 
economics of a project. The response has been a tiered feed-in tariff for wind, and 
China’s first foray into offshore wind farms, comprising 34 turbines providing 100MW 
to supply the Shanghai Expo(Zeppezauer and Carnabuci 2009). 
 
Fig. 12 He Lan Shan wind farm, Ningxia (Photo: Li Junfeng) 
PV: China is well blessed with solar resources, with over two thirds of it receiving more 
than 5,000 MJ per square metre annually(Ni 2009). As we see from fig. 13, like wind the 
greatest potential is in the west, and Tibet in particular. However, considering this huge 
potential, the utilisation of PV in China is very low, only 2% of global installed capacity 
in 2009, which from fig. 14 ranks it seventh in global terms. Most of this comprised the 
one million or so small rural off-grid systems as part of the rural electrification 
program (Martinot and Li 2007).   
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Fig. 13 China solar resource (Ni 2009) 
 
Fig. 14 Worldwide solar PV capacity 2009 (REN21 2010) 
The U.S., on the other hand, has experienced impressive growth in PV over the last 
decade, and had an installed capacity of over 1GW at the end of 2009, which ranked it 
fourth globally (Atkinson, Shellenberger et al. 2009). However, it’s worth noting that 
just one state – California – accounted for more than half the total (REN21 2010). 
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So, it’s true to say that in PV, the U.S. has a substantial lead on China, but this picture 
has started to change in just the last eighteen months as China’s installations of grid 
connected PV have grown rapidly, albeit from a very small base, from240MW in 2008 
to 400MW in 2009 (Martinot 2010). The reason for this sudden take-off of PV 
installations is that in the past the Chinese government viewed PV as being too 
expensive for widespread domestic use, and has concentrated on building capacity in 
wind power. Then, during the GFC, funding for new projects and government subsidies 
was drying up in the traditional PV markets of Europe and the U.S., and China was faced 
with a problem of overproduction, rapidly falling prices, and the prospect of an 
embarrassing collapse of its showcase hi-tech PV industry. The government seized on 
the opportunity to ramp up domestic demand, but instead of following the trend 
around the rest of the world for small distributed domestic systems, China has chosen 
to concentrate on medium sized ‘utility’ PV power stations greater than 150kW. This 
replicates the successful strategy followed in wind power, and Swartz (2010) believes, 
“...  large scale development of solar power will occur more rapidly through a 
coordinated effort led by a rather short list of government controlled enterprises”  
 
Fig. 15 Examples of medium scale PV power generation. Above: BIPV in Zhejiang  (Li and Ma 
2009). Below: PV power station, Yang Ba Jing, Tibet (Photo: Li Junfeng)  
21 
 
Solar hot water: China dominates in the use of solar hot water, with 70% of world 
capacity – fig. 16. More than 10% of Chinese households heat their water by solar, 
which represents 60 million rooftop solar hot water systems or 105 GWth of total 
capacity (Martinot and Li 2010). A decade ago most systems were in rural areas that 
didn’t have access to central or district heating systems, but  recent growth has been 
mainly in newly built urban tower blocks and houses, such as those in Fig 17. 
 
Fig. 16 Worldwide solar hot water capacity (REN21 2010) 
 
Fig. 17 Rooftop Solar HW, Kunming, Yunan (Photo: US NREL) 
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Annual growth rates have been an impressive 20-25%. In  2000 there was only 35 
million square metres of capacity, but by 2006 this had risen to 100 million square 
metres, and by 2009 to 145 million square metres (REN21 2009). The official target for 
2020 is 300 million square metres (Martinot and Li 2010), though the Chinese 
Renewable Energy Association (CREA) is predicting it will be more like 800 
(CREIA/NDRC 2007), which would see half of Chinese households using solar hot 
water. This compares to only 1.4 million square metres installed in the U.S. in 2008, 
most of which was in pool heating, as shown by fig.18 (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration 2009). 
 
Fig. 18 Use of Solar Thermal Collectors in the U.S. 2008 Source (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration 2009) 
2.4  THIRD GENERATION RENEWABLES 
Third generation renewables are not yet at full commercialisation, so installed capacity 
will be limited to demonstration and pilot projects. Of the promising technologies, the 
U.S. definitely has the lead over China by leveraging its strength in technological 
innovation as we will see in the following chapter. For example, the U.S. has 431MW of 
concentrating solar power (CSP) capacity, which is 65% of the world total (most of the  
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rest is in Spain), and two new facilities are expected to come online in 2010 adding 
another 200MW (REN21 2010). Both countries are working on second generation 
biofuels which use algal or cellulosic sources rather than food crops. The U.S. already 
has twelve pilot and small scale demonstration plants running, producing 15 million 
litres a year, and the U.S. DOE (Department of Energy) has allocated US$564 million in 
grants to stimulate commercialisation of these technologies (REN21 2010). The Climate 
Group estimates that although China also has a number of pilot plants, their efforts in 
advanced biofuels are about 5 years behind that of the leaders in the U.S. and Europe 
(The Climate Group 2009). Ocean energy is currently being led by European countries 
(REN21 2010), but China has more than 18,000 km of coastline, with a reported 
potential of tidal energy across 424 sites of 20GW,  and has set a target of 3GW from 
ocean energy by 2020 (REN21 2009).  
2.5  MANUFACTURING CAPACITY 
PV industry: At first glance, PV manufacturing seems to be a strength of the U.S. - 
America’s First Solar is the largest single manufacturer of PV cells worldwide, 
dominates the technologically advanced ‘thin film’ end of the industry, and was the first 
to reach the psychologically important 1GW of production in a single year (REN21 
2010). However, in the 3rd quarter of this year two Chinese manufacturers – Suntech 
and Ja Solar – overtook First Solar in production (IMS Research 2010), and as a country 
China has been the largest producer of PV since 2008, and now supplies one third of 
worldwide demand – fig. 19.  
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Fig. 19 Top 15 PV manufacturers in the world Source (REN21 2010) 
PV manufacturing in China came from very modest beginnings, with production of 
about 17MW of modules to support the rural electrification program between 2002-
2004. Then in 2004 strong demand from international markets such as Spain, Germany, 
and the U.S. saw production ramp up rapidly  to 2GW annually by 2008, with what 
Morrow and Liu (2008) describe it as a fortuitous alignment of a rapidly growing global 
demand with China’s “current industrial and technology capabilities”. However, it was 
still considered to be too expensive a technology for widespread domestic use, and 
from fig. 20 we can see that 95% of production went for export, which led to 
accusations of, “... consumption abroad and pollution at home” (The Climate Group 
2009). As we saw in the previous section, this changed with the GFC in 2009 as the 
Chinese government took advantage of global oversupply and prices falling as much as 
50% to stimulate domestic demand. 
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Fig. 20 PV production in China versus installed capacity (REN21 2009) 
There have also been structural changes in the Chinese PV industry. In the early stages 
Chinese manufacturers were content to remain at the low cost end of the market, using 
technology purchased from abroad. However, global shortages of poly-silicon over the 
last three years have seen manufacturers vertically integrating and producing their 
own raw materials (REN21 2009). Also, recent investments in R&D and innovation 
have resulted in a move towards the more technically advanced end of the market, 
encroaching on the territory of US and Japanese manufacturers to produce thin film PV, 
which requires less crystalline silicon, and provides higher profit margins (The Climate 
Group 2009). See box 2 for Suntech, China’s PV success story. 
 
Box 2 – Suntech 
Founded in 2002 with just 20 employees, Suntech Power Holdings Ltd is now the world’s number 
two producer of solar cells, producing 7% of world output, has four factories employing 3,500 
people,  and  a  market  value  of  more  than  US$6  billion  (Martinot  and  Li 2007;  McDonald 2007; 
REN21 2010). 
Shi Zhengrong,  Suntech’s founder, was a research scientist in Sydney during the 1980’s working on 
the early developments of PV cells. He was lured back to his homeland by the opportunities, “I 
thought if I came back I could do something really good”, and a US$20 million grant by Wuxi city on 
the outskirts of Shanghai, which wanted to set up as a hi-tech manufacturing centre (Shi Zhengrong 
quoted in (McDonald 2007)). Since then he has bought out his original local government investors  
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Wind Industry: China’s wind turbine industry also had its roots in the rural 
electrification program of the 1980s, with about 380,000 small standalone turbines, 
ranging from 100W to 10kW, deployed over the last three decades (REN21 2009). 
However, there the similarities end, because the PV industry developed piecemeal in 
response to external demand for its products, and resulted in more than 500 large and 
small firms vying for a share of the market. In contrast the wind industry was 
deliberately nurtured by the central government, and 80% of the industry remains 
within control of a smaller number of state owned enterprises (Schwartz 2009). 
and used foreign venture capital, and then a listing on the New York Stock Exchange to grow. He is 
now  the  richest  man  in  China,  and  has  been  involved  in  design  of  recent  renewable  energy 
legislation in China that promotes PV in the same way as wind was in the 2005 REL. 
Unlike most Chinese manufacturing companies, innovation is at the heart of Suntech’s business 
model. With a doctorate in thin film PV from his time in Australia, Shi brought a number of patents 
back with him to China. Suntech now invests 5% of its revenue in R&D, and has established a world 
class  R&D  centre  containing  more  than  twenty  senior  researchers(Martinot  and  Li  2007).  In 
recognition of its innovative approach, Suntech won an international award in 2008 for, “... high 
quality, innovative, and energy-efficient PV cells and modules” (Morrow and Liu 2008). Suntech 
also leverages research capabilities abroad, and is working with the University of New South Wales 
on a new generation of cell codenamed ‘Pluto’ which will have efficiencies of 19% (Chan 2009) 
Until very recently the Chinese government has viewed PV as too expensive for use within China, 
and has chosen to concentrate on biomass, hydro, solar HW and wind instead. Accordingly, 95% of 
China’s PV production goes for export to the main PV consumers of Germany, Spain, and the U.S. 
However, starting in 2009, the government has put a major emphasis on deployment of large scale 
PV  power  stations,  and  the  domestic  market  is  poised  to  take off,  although  ironically,  the  rock 
bottom prices the government projects are demanding has export oriented producers like Suntech 
complaining they cannot make money out of the domestic market!(Schwartz 2010) 
The  next  stage  of  Suntech’s  expansion  is  to  set  up  manufacturing  abroad  –  specifically  North 
America, to take advantage of the expected growth in the market due to recent ARRA funding. 
Suntech’s    Arizona  plant  opened  in  October  2010  with  a  staff  of  75  and  capacity  of 
30MW(Renewable Energy World 2010), while at the same time they announced plans to build a 
silicon manufacturing plant in Ontario, Canada (Energy Matters 2010).  
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Fig. 21 Top 10 wind turbine manufacturers worldwide (REN21 2010) 
In the early 2000s, the Chinese government recognised that wind technology was the 
lowest cost and most easily scalable technology to meet its aspirations in renewable 
energy. Furthermore the technology and manufacturing expertise required was not 
particularly hi-tech, and well within the engineering and manufacturing capabilities of 
Chinese industries at the time (Berrah, Feng et al. 2007). We’ll see in the next section 
that the 2005 Renewable Energy Law (REL) focussed on growing wind power, and as 
demand rose steeply, the government was determined to nurture a domestic industry 
to supply it rather than rely on imports. The most blatant support given to the nascent 
industry was the requirement that wind turbines have 70% domestically produced 
content. This policy had the desired effect and by 2009 three Chinese manufacturers 
(Sinovel, Goldwind, and Dongfang) were in the top ten worldwide, and Chinese 
companies produced 30% of world output - see fig. 21. Also, more than 100 domestic 
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parts suppliers of gear boxes, generators and blades, have grown to supply the 
industry, though it still tends to rely on imports and foreign companies for key 
components such as precision bearings, electrical control systems, and inverters. 
Admittedly Chinese turbines are behind their competitors from Europe and the US both 
in terms of size (most production is sub 1MW) and technology – mainly fixed pitch 
constant speed, rather than variable pitch, variable speed systems offered by 
international manufacturers (Martinot and Li 2010). However, the leading companies 
are investing in R&D in the hope of catching up in these respects, and Goldwind, for 
example, is now offering the important larger 2.5 and 3MW models required for China’s 
ambitious wind mega-projects, and which previously could only be supplied by foreign 
companies operating in China (Peidong, Yanli et al. 2009). 
As the wind turbine industry in China matures it has resulted in intense competition 
and falling prices, and as Schwartz (2010) explains, “The tried and true ‘safety valve’ for 
excess capacity development throughout Chinese industry – exports – is quickly 
becoming a necessary component in the marketing strategy of every Chinese wind 
equipment manufacturer”. Goldwind has already opened a North American sales office, 
and in 2009 the first project was announced in the U.S. to use Chinese manufactured 
wind turbines for a 600MW wind farm in Texas (Rudolf 2009). So, although the U.S. is 
still the world’s largest wind market, it only has one manufacturer in the top ten, 
producing 12% of world output as we see from fig. 21. As a result, the U.S. Department 
of Commerce reports the trade deficit in wind turbine components has been rising 
steadily since 2004, and as we see from fig. 22, crossed the psychologically important 
threshold of more than 50% foreign components in 2008 (Atkinson, Shellenberger et 
al. 2009).  
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Fig. 22 U.S. Trade deficit in wind turbine components (Atkinson, Shellenberger et al. 2009) from 
US Department of Commerce figures 
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3  THE THREE PILLARS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 
“It is intellectually and politically unsettling to realize that, if the West cannot 
quickly straighten out its systems of government, only politically unreformed 
states like China will be able to make the decisions that a nation needs to survive 
in today’s hi-speed, high-tech, increasingly globalized world.” Orville Schell quoted 
by (Schuman 2010) 
3.1  INNOVATION 
In his book ‘China: The race to market’, Story (2003) explains how China developed 
from an insecure and inwardly focussed state in the early years of communism, to 
become the world’s factory that we see today. It was achieved through a careful 
balancing act of protectionism and market reforms – attracting foreign technology with 
the promise of reduced costs, tax breaks, and a huge domestic market; then applying its 
advantages of cheap labour, mass production, and readily available capital; and once 
capacity and quality are attained, complete the circle by re-exporting to the world. By 
repeating this strategy China has been able to dominate successive manufacturing 
industries such as toys, clothing, electronics – and now renewable energy (Naughton 
2007). However, through the Solow growth model (Solow 1957) we now understand 
that physical factors of production, such as capital, only account for about 15% of the 
economic growth per unit of labour for a country, and that the remainder (or Solow 
residual) relies on innovation or human/intellectual capital (Romer 1986). The 
implications of this for China have not been lost on its leaders – they realise that just as 
the Asian Tigers, such as Japan and Korea, had to cross the threshold from 
manufacturer to innovator to continue to grow, so must China (Wu 2009). This strategy 
was encapsulated in the ‘Medium to long term plan of National Science and Technology 
Development (2006-2020)’ as the following quote illustrates: “China is determined to  
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ensure the sustainability of its economic and social development, to which the 
innovativeness of business enterprises is critical” (Zhang, Zeng et al. 2009). 
 The signs are that this transition is starting to take place. Fig. 23 shows a crossover 
point as early as in 1998 where  Chinese companies were relying less on importing 
technology and more on R&D to develop their own. 
 
Fig. 23 Chinese companies’ expenditure on technology imports vs. R&D 1995-2006 (Zhang, Zeng 
et al. 2009) 
Also there has been a doubling of the number of people engaged in R&D from 1995 to 
2006, and in the same period R&D intensity (defined as R&D expenditure as a share of 
GDP) rose from 0.5% to 1.4% (Zhang, Zeng et al. 2009). Patents registered by Chinese 
companies have risen thirteen times, from a little over 5,000 in 1995 to more than 
76,000 in 2006, although a few exceptional companies dominate. Huawei for example, 
lodged 1,365 or 25% of all China’s international patents in 2007 (Zhang, Zeng et al. 
2009).  
While China is improving in this regard, innovation still remains a relative strength of 
the U.S.. The Breakthrough Institute argues, “The United States has natural innovation 
advantages, including a skilled workforce, world class universities and research 
institutions, fluid capital markets, an open society and vibrant creative culture”  
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(Atkinson, Shellenberger et al. 2009). The American Energy Innovation Council points 
out that the U.S. has been a leading innovator in energy since the days of Tesla and 
Edison, and has pioneered most of the recent innovations in solar PV, CSP, and wind 
turbines (American Energy Innovation Council 2010). Indeed, The OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Outlook ranks the U.S. as having the most renewable energy 
patents at 20.2%, just slightly ahead of Japan (OECD 2008).  
But while innovation is still a strength, the US may be slipping in relative terms. The 
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation recently ranked the U.S. sixth out 
of 40 industrial countries in terms of innovation competitiveness (Ezell 2009), and fig. 
24 shows that whilst well positioned in R&D intensity overall, the U.S. is one of the 
lowest in growth rate. The Breakthrough Institute raises another worrying prospect, 
that, because of the globalisation of the economy, innovation can no longer be thought 
of in terms of national boundaries. Today’s global companies will establish their R&D 
facilities where the manufacturing and markets are, and as an example they cited U.S. 
firm Applied Materials who built the world’s largest PV R&D facility in Xian, China 
(Jenkins and Swezey 2010).   
 
Fig. 24 Intensity and growth rate of R&D for selected countries in 2004 (Zhang, Zeng et al. 2009)  
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3.2   FUNDING 
The World Bank describes how the development of a whole new sector of an economy 
like renewable energy requires a complex continuum of funding, matching the risk 
appetites, returns, and timescale of the investors with the stage of development of the 
technology (Zhang, Zeng et al. 2009) – see fig. 25. Historically, this process of bringing 
together the innovators and the money to fund them has also been a strength of the U.S. 
capitalist system with its angel investors, venture capitalists and private financial 
institutions (Bloomberg 2010). The information technology (IT) revolution is widely 
held up as an example of this system at its best, but we will see that renewable energy 
has not been so well served by this model, even before the GFC reduced investment in 
clean energy projects by 40% in 2009 (Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2010).  
 
Fig. 25 Types of funding used at selected stages of innovation (PEW Group 2010) 
At the earliest stages of an industry, before technology has been proven and therefore 
the risks of failure are too high to attract private capital, companies have to rely on 
government funding or self funding. However, compared to other innovation intensive 
growth industries, fig. 26 shows that the energy sector in the U.S. spends only 0.25% of  
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its revenues on R&D, compared to 5-15% in biotechnology and information technology, 
and an all industry average of 2.6% (American Energy Innovation Council 2010). It is 
also declining, having fallen by more than half in the last decade (Atkinson, 
Shellenberger et al. 2009).  
 
Fig. 26 Comparison of R&D expenditure for different U.S. industries (Atkinson, Shellenberger et 
al. 2009) 
Government funding has also been steadily falling from a high during the oil crises of 
the 1970’s, to less than half in 2008 - see fig.27. The US$4.3 billion spent on renewable 
energy in 2009 compares to US$30 billion in health care, and US$80 billion in 
defence(Atkinson, Shellenberger et al. 2009), which prompted Inslee and Hendricks 
(2008) to comment on the irony that, “We have spent over $82 billion to fight a war 
over oil and only $3 billion to develop new energy sources so that we would not have to 
fight such wars!”. 
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Fig. 27 Declining energy R&D budgets in the U.S. (Kammen and Nemet 2005) 
The later stages of scale-up and building capacity in a new technology rely more on the 
markets for funding, in the form of private institutions, banks, and IPOs. But, the size of 
investment needed, long payback periods, and high risks of failure with renewable 
energy technologies deters potential investors (American Energy Innovation Council 
2010). Specifically, there is a point in the development cycle at which, “... a technology is 
too capital intensive for a venture capital firm to continue investing, but too risky for a 
bank or private equity firm to bring it to scale” (Lacey 2010). Bloomberg (2010)has 
termed this the ‘commercialisation valley of death’, and it is particularly pertinent to 
renewable energy where the technologies are unproven, and the upfront capital costs 
of the first demonstration plant very high (Pope 2010). 
This lack of support from traditional funding sources has Bloomberg (2010) concluding 
that funding renewable energy should be a role for government, “The events of the past 
few years confirm that it is only with government help that commercialisation can be 
addressed, both in the short term and the long term. Only public institutions have 
‘public benefits’ obligations and the associated mandated risk-tolerance for such 
classes of investments, along with the capital available to make a difference at scale.”   
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While the U.S. renewable energy industry has been hampered by these funding 
problems, in China clean energy investments were up more than 50% in 2009 to 
US$34.6 billion, giving China the top spot in investment in renewables for the first time 
– see fig. 28. 
 
Fig. 28 Investment in Renewables (US$ billions) in 2009 (PEW Group 2010) 
The Chinese government has long understood that funding is one of the key success 
factors of developing renewable energy, and the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) put a figure of US$179 billion on what would be required over the 
next 15 years to meet the government’s RE targets (Jun 2007). A significant proportion 
of this will come from provisions in the 2005 Renewable Energy Law discussed in 
depth in the next section, but there is increasing diversity of sources of funding for RE 
in China, including venture capital, and particularly share offerings. Suntech and 
Goldwind, the leaders in China’s PV and wind industries led the way, and another US$2 
billion of China energy IPOs are expected on the Hong Kong stock market this year 
(Reuters 2010).  
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China now tops Ernst & Young’s (2010) latest ‘Renewable Energy Attractiveness 
Indices’, usurping the U.S. which had held the top position since 2006; and Deutsche 
Bank (2009) credits this to, “... a comprehensive and integrated government plan, 
supported by strong incentives ...” versus in the U.S., “... a more volatile market 
incentive approach, which has suffered from a start-stop approach”.   
So, interestingly, while the U.S. considers the failure of private funding to support clean 
energy and contemplates a return to a significant role for government, China seems to 
have an abundance of capital, and is seen as an increasingly attractive market for 
foreign private investment. 
3.3  POLICY 
The influential REN21 Global Renewables Status Report credits policies with a decisive 
role in stimulating renewable energy, 
“In countries with some type of policy target and/or promotion policy related 
to renewable energy, these policies have exerted substantial influence on the 
market, investment, and industry developments ... and the literature clearly 
shows that policies have had a major impact on the speed and extent of 
renewable energy development.”(REN21 2010) 
China has had policies encouraging the use of renewable energy since the mid 1980’s, 
under the guise of environmental laws, energy efficiency regulations, and rural 
development programs that resulted in a sure but steady increase in the use of 
renewables over the last two decades (Peidong, Yanli et al. 2009). However, it wasn’t 
until the landmark Renewable Energy Law (REL) of 2005, that there was a specific 
focus and comprehensive policy on renewable energy across the board. In formulating 
the new REL, China’s leaders went through a comprehensive and deliberate process of 
international research and consultation, hoping to learn from the experiences of those  
38 
 
who had gone before them, as is acknowledged by Li Junfeng, Secretary General of the 
Chinese Renewable Energy Industry Association and one of the drafters of the REL, “We 
have spent a lot of time and energy learning from the successes and failures of our 
partners in Europe and around the world. We believe that this law can start a 
renewable energy revolution in China.”(Butler 2005) 
The REL elevated the cause of renewables to a strategic level in China, and bridged the 
traditional policy areas of command and control, and market mechanisms:- 
-  Power utilities were required to purchase energy from renewable energy 
generators, but only if they had enough demand to use it. 
-  Consumers were to pay the increased cost of renewable energy through cost 
sharing mechanisms. 
-  A feed-in tariff for biomass was established, and similar “government guided 
prices” were established for wind. 
-  National generating companies had to produce a mandated share of their power 
from renewables. For small generators this was 1% from non-hydro by 2010, 
and 3% by 2020. For generators with greater than 5GW capacity, it was 3% by 
2010 and 8% by 2020. 
-  New financing and guarantee mechanisms were put in place so that developers 
of renewable energy projects could benefit from direct subsidies and discount 
loans from the finance department, and tax exemptions of three years, plus 
another three years at 50%. 
-  Wind power was specifically targeted with the “wind power concession 
program”, where companies were invited to tender for government wind farm 
projects. The government then guaranteed a fixed price for the power 
generated for the duration of the project. By August 2008, a total of 49 wind  
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farm projects had benefitted from the concession program, with a combined 
capacity of 8.8GW(REN21 2009). 
-  A US$440 billion fund was established to support research, education and 
standards (REN21 2010). 
-  Solar hot water systems were mandated nationwide in certain types of new 
buildings, such as hospitals, schools, and hotels, and some provinces extended 
that to certain classes of residential buildings (REN21 2010). 
Even though a lot of planning and forethought went into the REL, a distinctive 
characteristic has been the willingness of the government to learn as it goes along, and 
continually tweak and revise measures to be more effective, in line with Deng 
Xiaoping’s policy of, “Crossing the river by feeling for the stones” (Story 2003).  
Accordingly, there have been a number of revisions since 2006 to address some of the 
problems with the original law that surfaced in the first few years of its operation:- 
-  More detailed planning and co-ordination of renewables with overall power 
capacity has been mandated to overcome some of the problems with utilising 
wind capacity mentioned in section 2.3. Measures for energy storage and smart 
grids have also been added in recognition of the key role these will play in 
allowing greater renewables penetration of the grid in the future. 
-  The provisions forcing utilities to buy available renewable power were 
strengthened. They must now buy all renewable power generated whether they 
have demand for it or not, and deadlines and penalties have been specified for 
non-compliance. 
-  The surcharge on electricity was increased to provide extra funding for feed-in 
tariffs and government sponsored RE projects. 
-  The wind concession program was often criticised as favouring state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) who had the right connections and access to cheap capital.  
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This resulted in artificially cheap prices for wind power, but no incentive for 
quality developments and continued R&D (Zeppezauer and Carnabuci 2009). 
So, the program has been replaced with a new multi-tier feed-in tariff, 
recognising that the best resource areas in Mongolia and the West do not 
require the same economic incentives as less favourable resource areas in the 
East. The feed-in tariff for biomass was also increased. 
-  As mentioned earlier, the government imposed a 70% domestic content 
requirement on all wind farms in 2005, but this was withdrawn in 2010 as it 
was deemed no longer necessary, as most turbines installed in 2009 were 
Chinese manufactured anyway. 
-  RE projects were exempted from local taxes, although this may have the 
perverse effect of reducing the incentive for local governments to support RE 
projects! 
-  The REL concentrated on biomass and wind, as they were the technologies 
available at the time. As mentioned in section 2.5, China has recently decided to 
promote the domestic use of PV technology in the form of medium sized PV 
‘power stations’, and so a raft of measures has been introduced to support this 
move:- 
o  The Golden Sun program provides for subsidies of 70% for stand-alone 
and 50% for grid connected PV of 300kW or larger.  More than 300 
projects, totalling 640MW, and about 20 billion yuan in subsidies, had 
been approved in the first six months of 2010 alone (Martinot 2010). 
o  Similar to the ‘concession program’ for wind farms in the original REL, 
the government will develop a number of flagship PV projects by 
putting contracts out for competitive bidding. Six projects have already 
been approved, with a total capacity of 60MW.  
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Underpinning all the measures in the REL and its amendments, have been bold and 
transparent renewable energy targets for 2010 and 2020 set out in the ‘11th Five Year 
Plan’ 2006, and the ‘Medium and Long Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy’ 
2007 (NDRC 2007). Moreover, China met its 2010 target of 10% of primary energy two 
years early, and has since indicated that it will increase its 2020 target significantly by 
increasing wind from a previous target of 30GW to 150GW, and solar PV from 1.8GW to 
20 GW (Martinot and Li 2010) – see fig. 29. 
 Lee (2009) argues that China’s authoritarian government has a distinct advantage in 
policy matters, versus the uncertainties of the western democratic model. Indeed, 
China has gained widespread international praise for the decisive way it has 
implemented renewable energy policies,  for example, 
“Despite early hiccups, it is now clear that the important reforms included in 
China’s 2005 Renewable Energy Law have been implemented with a speed and 
effectiveness that most countries can only envy” (REN21 2010).  
In contrast the U.S. has lacked a significant policy framework for renewable energy. In 
fact, successive energy acts under the Bush administration extended tax cuts and 
subsidies to fossil fuels and nuclear, with very little support for renewables (Furnas 
2009). But, with the election of Obama in 2008, things were expected to change. Indeed 
Obama himself said green energy would be his number one priority when he took office 
(Alternative Energy News 2008), and Stephen Chu, a scientist and clean energy 
advocate was appointed Energy Secretary to oversee the transition. However, then 
came more immediate and pressing issues of the global financial crisis, and health care 
reform, and despite the build-up, clean energy slipped down the list of priorities for the 
administration, as Obama himself admitted in a recent interview,  
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“During the last two years, we’ve not made as much progress as I wanted to 
make when I was sworn into office. It’s very hard to make progress on these 
issues in the midst of a huge economic crisis” (Mason 2010). 
 
  2006 
actual 
2009 
actual 
2010 
target 
2020 
target 
2020 
proposed 
Hydropower 
(GW) 
130  197  190  300  300 
Wind (GW)  2.6  25.8  5  30  150 
Biomass 
(GW) 
2.0  3.2  5.5  30  30 
PV (GW)  0.08  0.4  0.3  1.8  20 
Solar 
HW(mill m2)  
100  190  150  300   
Ethanol 
(mill tons) 
1  2  2  10   
Biodiesel 
(mill tons) 
0.05    0.2  2   
Biomass 
pellets (mill 
tons) 
0    1  50   
Biogas (bill 
m3) 
8    19  44   
 
Fig. 29 China’s renewable energy targets (Martinot and Li 2010)  
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That is not to say there hasn’t been any progress. In 2009 a new body was created to 
stimulate innovation in RE technology called the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
for Energy (ARPA-E). Its remit is, 
“To bring a freshness, excitement, and sense of mission to energy research that 
will attract many of the U.S.’s best and brightest minds, and focus on creative 
“out-of-the-box” transformational energy research that industry by itself cannot 
or will not support due to its high risk but where success would provide 
dramatic benefits for the nation” (ARPA-E 2010).  
ARPA-E was endowed with US$400 million in start-up funding, but even this only 
allowed it to fund 1% of the 3,700 proposals it received (American Energy Innovation 
Council 2010). 
 Then, as subsidies and tax cuts from the Bush era were about to expire, the U.S. 
stimulus package provided the Obama administration the chance to direct significant 
funding the way of renewables. Named the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA), it targeted three specific areas of renewable energy (WhiteHouse.gov 2010) :- 
1.  Cutting the cost of solar power in half by 2010, putting it on a par with retail 
electricity from the grid 
2.  Cutting the cost of batteries for electric vehicles by 70% between 2009 and 
2015, putting the lifetime cost of an electric vehicle on par with its non-electric 
counterpart 
3.  Doubling U.S. renewable energy generation capacity and U.S. manufacturing 
capacity by 2012.  
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Fig. 30 Breakdown of ARRA spending (WhiteHouse.gov 2010) 
However, the combined spend in these areas is only US$39 billion as we see from fig. 
30, which the Breakthrough Institute suggests is not nearly enough to achieve the bold 
aims set out above . In fact, they characterise it as merely, “a down payment on a new 
clean energy economy”, and go on to warn that unless followed up with a long term 
policy soon, ”will send U.S. clean energy markets off a clean tech funding cliff.” (Jenkins 
and Swezey 2010). That longer term policy was supposed to be the American Clean 
Energy and Security Act (ACESA), which contained the key pillars of a carbon trading 
scheme and a national renewable energy target. However, while it passed the U.S. 
House of Representatives in June 2009, following concerted Republican opposition in 
the Senate those two key measures were dropped from the legislation mid-2010, to 
leave a Bill that did little more than address who would pay for the clean-up of the BP 
Gulf oil spill, and some energy efficiency measures (Renewable Energy World 2010). 
0
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Much has since been written about the failure of ACESA, and the consensus seems to be 
that it is an example of the way the U.S. political system is currently paralysed by bi-
partisan politics and lobbying by special interest groups. The frustration of Democrats 
and renewable energy proponents with the lack of progress is palpable,  “Sit and watch 
us for seven days – just watch the floor [of the American Senate]. You know what you’ll 
see happening? Nothing. When I’m in the chair, I sit there thinking, I wonder what 
they’re doing in China right now?” (Freshman Democratic Senator Ken Salazar, quoted 
in  (Wilder 2010)). 
Recently a new Renewable Energy Target Bill was introduced to Congress, de-coupled 
from the political liability of the cap and trade proposal. However, in order to attract bi-
partisan support has been so watered down that the target of 15% (including energy 
efficiency) is actually below what the Energy Information Agency predicts in a BAU 
scenario (Energy Matters 2010).  
While concerted national action would be preferable, in its absence a number of 
individual states have forged ahead with renewable energy legislation. Thirty seven 
states now have renewable portfolio targets, eight mandate their utilities to offer green 
power to their customers, and four have feed-in tariffs (REN21 2010). Indeed, if you 
compare the range of policies enacted in the U.S. with China in fig. 31, we see that 
whilst the U.S. lags at a national level, almost all categories of policy are enacted 
somewhere at a state level.  
With the recent results in the American mid-term elections, the PEW Group believes it 
increasingly unlikely that the U.S. will be able to pass any substantial renewable energy 
legislation during the term of this administration (PEW Group 2010). Meanwhile, the 
Chinese National Energy Administration (NEA) is putting the final touches on the next 
stage in China’s RE revolution in the 12th five year plan, which will run from 2011-2015.   
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Policy  China  U.S. 
Feed-in tariffs  N  S 
Renewable portfolio standard  N  S 
Capital subsidies, grants, rebates  N  N 
Investment or other tax credits  N  N 
Sales tax, energy tax, excise tax, or VAT 
reduction 
N  S 
Tradeable RE certificates  -  S 
Energy production payments or tax credits  N  N 
Net metering  -  S 
Public investment, loans, financing  N  S 
Public competitive bidding  N  S 
 
Fig. 31 Comparison of policies in force in China and U.S. (N = national S = Specific states only) 
(REN21 2010) 
It is an ambitious strategy integrating nuclear power, clean coal, natural gas, and 
renewables into a vision of a low carbon future that contains major ‘energy bases’, 
cross regional energy transmission corridors and energy pricing reflecting 
environmental costs. In recognition of the pressure put on energy intensity by the 
rapidly urbanising population, special emphasis will be put on  ‘low carbon cities’ 
integrating electric vehicles, smart grids, and green buildings (People's Daily Online 
2010).  
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4  DISCUSSION 
“Inexplicably and tragically, the US is content to drop further and further behind 
in the development of energy technology with each passing week. While China is 
hiring, researching, developing, importing, exporting – and dominating the world 
of 21st century energy, we seem to be content to argue and point fingers at each 
other” Craig Shields of 2GreenEnergy (Shields 2010) 
4.1  WHY CHINA IS WINNING 
China SWOT Analysis 
Strengths  Weaknesses 
  Abundant resources 
  Already largest user of RE 
worldwide 
  Traditional technologies of 
Biomass & hydro & still potential 
to grow 
  No. 2 position in wind, and 
growing rapidly 
  Small base in PV, poised to grow 
  Dominates manufacturing in 
Wind, PV, and Solar HW 
  Car and battery manufacturing = 
EVs 
  Geothermal – lacks resources 
  Weak grid infrastructure 
  Industries characterised by 
oversupply & intense price 
competition 
  Behind in development of biofuels 
and 3rd gen. RE technologies 
  Energy mix still dominated by 
fossil fuels 
  RE resources in the West, demand 
in the East 
 
Opportunities  Threats 
  Strong policy framework 
  Decisive government  
  Abundant funding 
  Strong domestic demand to 
support industries 
  Low cost manufacturing base 
  Willingness to learn from others & 
co-operate 
  Varied geography – wide range 
and large potential of RE resource 
not yet exploited 
  Inexperience with market 
mechanisms 
  Lacks innovation culture 
  Positioning at the lower end of the 
technology curve 
  Energy demand growing so 
quickly that RE cannot keep up 
 
 
Fig. 32 China SWOT analysis  
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China clearly has a number of key advantages in its goal to be a renewable energy 
powerhouse. The first comes courtesy of nature – it is a vast country, with a diversity of 
geography, endowing it with a wide variety of potential RE resources. It was already 
exploiting the traditional ones such as biomass combustion, biogas, and 
hydroelectricity to satisfy the energy demands of its vast rural population, long before 
renewable energy gained international attention as a solution to energy security and 
climate change. There is still much untapped resource available in these 1st generation 
renewables, and especially with the application of more modern technologies, China is 
expecting to double its utilisation of traditional renewable energy over the next decade. 
However, as China becomes increasingly urbanised, and the energy intensity rises 
again for the first time in thirty years, this is not enough to satisfy the economy’s 
insatiable thirst for energy (Rosen and Houser 2007). Ironically, China’s rapidly 
growing energy demand can work in the favour of renewables. In developed countries 
deploying renewables requires replacing existing traditional energy infrastructure, 
with the associated issues of stranded costs, displaced jobs, and opposition from 
powerful vested interests. China, in comparison, is only now going through its 
industrial revolution and building the energy infrastructure it will rely on for the 
future. Just as it ‘leapfrogged’ older technology in other areas such as 
telecommunications (Jamieson 2002), so it can invest in low carbon energy, efficient 
buildings, electric vehicles etc. from the beginning. 
In building the infrastructure for a low carbon future, China’s leaders have been 
determined they will not become reliant on technology from abroad. Indeed, Ying 
describes the three driving principles of China’s renewable energy strategy:- 
1.  To harness renewables to help supply growing energy demand, and do it in as 
clean a way as possible.   
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2.  The government is determined that the equipment to do this will come, as far as 
possible, from domestic suppliers, which means acquiring technology from 
abroad and rapidly developing new industries. 
3.  China would also like to position itself as a supplier of low carbon technology to 
the rest of the world (Jun 2007). 
To succeed in this strategy, China is able to leverage the same advantages that have 
already made it the low cost manufacturing centre for many other industries - an 
efficient and low cost manufacturing base, access to raw materials, cheap and plentiful 
labour, ample funding, and a domestic market large enough to attain economies of scale 
without having to rely on exports (Atkinson, Shellenberger et al. 2009). Ernst & Young 
(2010) suggest it is no coincidence that China’s leaders chose to concentrate on 
building capacity in solar hot water and wind power first, as these are mature and 
readily available technologies, well within the capacity of China’s factories to make. To 
be successful in these does not require innovation, which is China’s weak spot, and by 
picking the technologies carefully and playing to its strengths, China has been able to, 
“... overcome the largest single hurdle to large scale development of renewable energy 
world-wide: the ability to compete economically with fossil fuels” (Martinot and Li 
2007). 
The Chinese domination of the relatively more high tech, less labour intensive, PV 
industry was less predictable, and potentially more worrying to the U.S. as it doesn’t 
play to China’s traditional strengths. The PV industry in China has been predominantly 
a private sector initiative, and happened without the government offering the kind of 
protection and guaranteed demand there was in the wind industry. As China attempts 
to move up the technology curve, the way the PV industry developed through 
entrepreneurs, tapping foreign private capital, and innovation, could provide a model 
for the emerging third generation technologies of advanced biofuels, marine power and  
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solar thermal. Electric vehicles are another obvious candidate, as it matches China’s 
current capacity in auto and battery manufacturing with a need to reign in the 
mushrooming demand for transport fuel – see box 3. However, as China moves up the 
technology curve it will become increasingly distanced from its comparative 
advantages, and come into direct competition with the U.S. who sees this as their space. 
The following quote shows that the Chinese government is aware of the delicate 
balancing act required of it to achieve these objectives, 
“The current urgent task is to save energy and enhance energy efficiency. 
Meanwhile, China should also develop renewable and new energy, and it will be 
able to achieve superiority in certain fields if it can effectively combine 
advantages in cost with technological innovation, but developing a low carbon 
economy will take a very long time ... maybe several generations.” (People's 
Daily Online 2010) 
In fact, the steering hand of the government is perhaps China’s greatest asset in 
renewable energy.  The government has demonstrated a “... broad, deep, and 
irreversible” commitment to renewable energy that has drawn praise from many 
quarters (Jun 2007). For example, the IEA’s Chief Economist commented, “I am 
following the energy policies of almost all the big countries of the world, and there is no 
other government which is as dynamic as the Chinese government in putting energy 
policies in place,”(Faith Birol, quoted in Simpson (2010)). The fact that it is an 
authoritarian regime, unencumbered by bi-partisan politics, powerful industry lobby 
groups, and the fickleness of voters is definitely an advantage. However, it would be 
unfair to put too much weight on this, and risks missing out on the opportunity to learn 
from their success. In renewable energy, China’s government has shown a willingness 
to learn from other’s experiences, experiment with market as well as command and  
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control policies, and has moved with a swiftness and decisiveness that belies the size 
and complexity of the task.  
There are, of course, remaining problems that need to be overcome, as highlighted in 
the weaknesses and threats section of our SWOT analysis – grid support, 
manufacturing overshoot, inexperience with market mechanisms, and the need to 
boost innovation. China’s policy of “crossing the river by feeling the stones” means that 
once problems are identified, mechanisms to correct them can be put in place swiftly 
and effectively, and we’ve already seen how the 2009 amendments to the REL have 
targeted a number of these deficiencies. The stimulus package in 2009 also funnelled 
extra funding into grid infrastructure, including smart grid technology. However, there 
are some issues that don’t lend themselves to this authoritarian approach, and in fact 
are fundamentally contrary to it. Lou Schwartz (2010) identifies a number of these – 
such as engendering a culture of innovation; market mechanisms to prevent the over-
supply bubbles that seem to be a feature of China’s renewables industries; and 
recognition that co-operation with the west and a reduction in trade frictions would be 
more advantageous in the long term. These are cultural changes, and are more difficult 
and will take longer to implement than simply passing rules and regulations, and may 
ultimately prove to be the constraining factor on China’s domination of renewable 
energy.  
 
Box 3 – Electric Vehicles 
Oil is destined to become China’s energy ‘Achilles Heel’, as it has little in the way of indigenous reserves, 
and has come too late to the international oil scene to secure the better supplies. Sixty percent of that 
oil demand is due to China’s fleet of over 50 million vehicles, and that figure is growing at an annual 
rate of 25% (Wu 2009). China is already the world’s third largest manufacturer of vehicles, and in 2009 
new car sales overtook those of America for the first time (The Climate Group 2009).  
Meanwhile, electric vehicles (EVs) substitute electricity for oil as a fuel source. True, in China 70% of 
that electricity comes from coal fired power stations, but even then the electric motor is inherently 
more efficient than the internal combustion engine, reducing total energy demand; and the effect of   
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millions of EVs on the grid can have benefits for load management, and allowing greater renewables 
penetration (Simpson 2009). China already has a number of significant advantages in converting its 
vehicle fleet to EVs :- 
1.  With car ownership only at 128/1000 now, compared to developed countries like Australia 
619/1000,  China  has  the  opportunity  to  cut  straight  to  an EV  infrastructure  as  it  grows, 
rather  than  having  the  issues  of  replacing  existing  oil  infrastructure  (refineries,  petrol 
stations) and stranded costs like in developed countries. 
2.  China already has as many electric bikes and scooters on the road as it has cars – 50 million – 
meaning it has the familiarity of use and public acceptance of electric vehicles, lacking in 
western countries. 
3.  80% of purchasers in China are buying their first car, so they will not be so aware of the EVs 
failings in terms of range and power versus conventional cars, particularly as 60% of those 
are small fuel efficient models anyway (The Climate Group 2009). 
4.  China already has a small but growing auto industry, and substantial manufacturing capacity 
in the technologically advanced lithium iron phosphate batteries required for EVs. It also 
holds one third of reserves, and controls 97% of current global production of rare earths, 
those  elements  required  in  small  but  vital  amounts  for  production  of  electronics  –  and 
specifically advanced batteries (Walet 2010). 
5.  Then there are the usual advantages China has in any manufacturing industry – cheap labour, 
a massive domestic market that allows rapid economies of scale, and a government willing to 
promote growth while protecting the fledgling industry from foreign competitors. 
As Suntech is to China’s PV industry, then BYD (Build Your Dreams) is to its fledgling EV market. The 
former battery manufacturer turned auto manufacturer with the goal of becoming the world’s largest 
EV manufacturer by 2025, produced the first mass produced plug-in BEV a year ahead of Japanese and 
US competitors. Says its founder Wang Chuanfu, “We have every confidence in surpassing GM and 
Toyota and other global auto makers in electric vehicle technology” (The Climate Group 2009). US 
financier Warren Buffet must have faith in that claim, as he bought 10% of BYD, despite early sales 
results being disappointing - less than 100 units in its first year of sales in 2008. Analysts say the 
market was waiting for substantial government support before it took off, and in March 2009 that’s 
what it got. The ‘Automobile Industry Adjustment and Stimulus Plan’ aims to ramp up EV production 
to half a million annually by 2011, with sales of EVs being 10% by 2012 and 20-30% by 2030. Already 
10,000 subsidised electric taxis, busses and other public service vehicles have been put on the road in 
ten showcase cities by means of a demonstration project (Atkinson, Shellenberger et al. 2009). 
The U.S. has a similar problem to China with oil dependence, and if anything has a greater claim to the 
future of the world auto industry, having given birth to it originally. However, the U.S. has already had 
two false starts in EVs - in 1899 there were more EVs sold in the world that petrol cars – 1,575 versus 
976 (Kohler 2010), and a brief experiment in modern EVs in the form of GM’s EV1 in the late 1990s. 
The incentives are greater now, Detroit is no longer the industrial powerhouse it used to be, and with 
China, Japan and South Korea already ahead of the game, the US auto industry has to engage or be left 
behind at the starting gate. In 2009 the U.S. only had two factories capable of producing the advanced 
batteries needed for EVs, and this is 2% of world capacity [35], whereas China, Japan & South Korea 
between them have 80% of production (The Climate Group 2009).  
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4.2  WHY THE U.S. IS FALLING BEHIND 
U.S. SWOT Analysis 
Strengths  Weaknesses 
  Diversity of RE portfolio (& 
nuclear) 
  Strong in 1st gen RE – biomass & 
hydro 
  Leader in 1st gen. Biofuels 
  World No.1 in installed wind 
capacity  
  4th in PV capacity & leading 
manufacturer (First Solar)  
  Ahead in developing 3rd gen. RE 
such as CSP, advanced biofuels, 
marine 
  Grid infrastructure & smart grid 
  RE is small proportion of energy 
supply 
  Hydro & biomass growth 
constrained  
  1st gen. biofuels discredited 
  Manufacturing – increasingly 
relying on foreign imports of Solar 
HW, PV, and wind equipment  
  Boom/bust cycles in wind & PV 
Opportunities  Threats 
  Culture of innovation & 
technology 
  Private capital system 
  Innovative state level policies 
  Significant short term support 
through ARRA  
  Competitive spirit – ie Apollo 
model 
 
  Rate of innovation slowing & low 
re-investment in R&D by energy 
industry  
  Government funding declining & 
private capital dried up due to GFC  
  Strong vested interest of fossil 
fuels & nuclear 
  Lack of consistent federal policies, 
failure of ACESA, and political 
gridlock 
  Mistrust of ‘big government’ eg. 
Tea Party movement – expect 
markets to do it on their own 
Fig.33 U.S. SWOT analysis 
The first issue with America’s clean energy strategy is defining the goal. GHG emissions 
and global warming have become political liabilities, particularly since the failure of the 
Copenhagen talks, and U.S. politicians avoid framing the problem in those terms 
anymore. Instead they talk about creating new industries, jobs, and restoring America’s 
leadership in innovation – much less contentious issues, and better vote winners in  
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uncertain economic times. This trend is dangerous because by concentrating on jobs it 
focuses the debate almost entirely on manufacturing renewables, and ignores the 
important benefits of using renewables – i.e. mitigating the effects of climate change 
and providing energy security. Anyway, as Larson (2010) points out, the assumption 
that manufacturing renewables is the only path to green jobs is misplaced, “The United 
States will still gain many new green-collar jobs, in installation and maintenance, which 
can only be locally based, as well as sales teams, conference planners, and other 
positions already arising to support the growing green-tech field.”  
In fact, America is already well placed in the use of renewables. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
they have a greater diversity of technologies at work than China, and are ahead of China 
both in deploying the 2nd generation technologies of biofuels, wind and PV, and in 
developing the next generation technologies such as advanced biofuels and CSP. But, by 
focussing the debate on jobs and manufacturing they risk losing this advantage as 
existing RE subsidies expire, short term stimulus spending runs its course, and the long 
term support embodied in the ACESA legislation fails to pass a hostile congress. So, 
America should clarify what its objectives are – to be a leader in using RE, 
manufacturing it, or both? I would argue that the former is still a desirable and 
necessary objective even if the latter cannot be achieved. 
I believe another flaw in America’s current strategy is the assumption amongst certain 
business interests and politicians that all they need to do to regain the lead in 
renewable energy is unleash America’s famed innovation, entrepreneurs, and market 
forces, as in the following examples, 
“Unlike China’s government economic planners, who have laid out [renewable 
energy] priorities in a five-year plan, the United States should address these 
challenges in our uniquely American way, by harnessing and channelling the 
vitality of our entrepreneurs.” (Furnas 2009)  
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“By tapping America’s entrepreneurial spirit and long-standing leadership in 
technology innovation, we can set a course for a prosperous, sustainable 
economy – and take control of our energy future.” (American Energy Innovation 
Council 2010) 
“America’s entrepreneurial traditions and strengths in innovation are 
considerable, giving it the potential to recoup leadership and market share in 
future” (PEW Group 2010) 
However, as we explored back in chapter 3 the bedrock of America’s strength in 
innovation – sustained investment in R&D, skills and education amongst the workforce, 
and the right institutional infrastructure - are slowly being eroded. More importantly, 
there is growing evidence that innovation is not the key to renewable energy at this 
point in time – see for example Lacey (2010), Revkin  (2010), and The Climate Group 
(2009). Rosen (2007) argues that the technologies we need are already available, 
what’s holding us back is the more mundane problem of building them up to a scale, 
and driving down the costs, so renewable energy can compete with incumbent 
technologies such as fossil fuels (Revkin 2010). The Climate Group supports this view, 
“We already know which technologies we need to use – across transport, energy, 
buildings and industry – to achieve [GHG emissions] targets. The challenge lies in 
developing, deploying and funding those technologies at the massive scale and rapid 
pace needed.” (The Climate Group 2009). What’s more, this requires the strong hand of 
government to overcome existing barriers, not leaving it to unfettered markets. Stern 
(2007) describes how the free market system has abjectly failed to provide a solution 
to global warming or develop renewable energy, in what he characterises as an 
example of market failure, because climate change is a public good. Even Bill Gates, the 
‘entrepreneur in chief’ believes that the scale of investment needed, versus the 
significant risks, are beyond the capabilities of business, and renewable energy needs  
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strong support from the government (Pontin 2010). Meanwhile, though some argue 
that the development of renewable energy should be left to market forces, a recent 
study shows that US$79 billion in subsidies and tax breaks were poured into oil, coal, 
and nuclear in a succession of energy bills during the Bush era (Environmental Law 
Institute 2009). In fact, history is littered with examples of the U.S. government 
intervening in market mechanisms to nurture specific industries or technologies, in 
agriculture, railroads, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, and of course – the Apollo space 
program. Even the IT boom, often quoted as an example of free market success that 
energy policy should try and emulate, was dependent on strong government 
investment in integrated circuits and the internet in the early years(Atkinson, 
Shellenberger et al. 2009).  
The current U.S. administration recognises this, and in formulating the ARRA, argued 
that, “Some industries of exceptional national importance, such as developing 
alternative energy, implementing health information technology, and manufacturing 
advanced vehicles, will likely not produce outcomes in the best interests of society on 
their own. In these sectors, the government will seek to assist and leverage the market 
to produce strong results” (WhiteHouse.gov 2010). Perhaps even this understates the 
scale of government involvement necessary. Energy infrastructure is huge and 
widespread, it permeates all levels of the economy and society, moving it to a more 
sustainable basis requires changing the everyday habits of ordinary people, industry 
and commerce. Inslee and Hendricks (2008) liken the paradigm shift required to the 
wholesale transformation of the American economy into the massive military-
industrial complex during the Second World War.  
 
  
57 
 
4.3  IS CHARACTERISING RENEWABLE ENERGY AS A RACE USEFUL? 
The objective of portraying renewable energy as a race is to raise the profile of the 
debate, and ignite the competitive spirit of American industry and the public to rally to 
the cause. However, my first observation is that it seems to have failed to arouse 
America’s enthusiasm in the same way the space race did four decades ago – maybe the 
issues aren’t as inspirational, the leader not charismatic enough, or the timing just 
unfortunate, because there are more pressing problems on people’s minds.  
Then there is the requirement that to be a race there must be one winner and one loser, 
but there is much evidence to suggest that renewable energy is not a zero sum game. 
John von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) defined a zero sum game as one where 
competition results in one party’s gains being exactly matched by the other party’s 
resultant loss – so the world in sum is no better or worse off.  Instead, renewable 
energy exhibits many of the characteristics of the ‘gains from trade’ theory which 
developed from Adam Smith’s work (Smith, Strahan et al. 1776), and therefore can be 
seen as a positive sum game. Specifically, China has a ‘comparative advantage’ (Ricardo 
1817) in manufacturing 2nd generation RE technology such as solar HW, wind turbines, 
and PV panels, because it has the low cost manufacturing capacity, abundant capital, 
and a large domestic market to bring economies of scale. It would therefore be an 
economically efficient outcome for China to specialise in this technology, whilst the U.S. 
specialises in something that fits its comparative advantages, and the two would trade 
to share the results of their labours. This concept gains added significance when we 
broaden this principle to a global scale - China can leverage its comparative advantage 
in renewable energy to bring about widespread adoption at a lower cost and in a 
shorter timescale than would otherwise happen, with particular benefit to poorer 
nations. As Martinot and Li (2007) suggest, the success of China in RE, “... could  
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constitute a true ‘tipping point’ for the global energy economy, with far reaching 
benefits not only for 1.3 billion Chinese, but also for the world’s 5 billion other people.”  
The risk to the U.S. of this is that China’s comparative advantage, and America’s 
weakness, is in manufacturing per se., with dire consequences to the U.S. balance of 
trade and manufacturing jobs. One possible solution is that the U.S. specialises in 
developing the technologies, licenses them to China to manufacture, and provides 
funding in return for a cut of the profits. Larson (2010) points to examples of this 
already happening, where universities and research labs in California develop new 
technologies, but look to partners in China to commercialise it; and partnerships 
between car manufacturers in the U.S. and battery manufacturers in China, who 
together can make electric vehicles. The Climate Group (2009) points out that both 
parties benefit from such cooperation – China gets to unlock the full potential of its low 
carbon industries by spreading the risk, and overcoming the technology, skills and 
financing gap it faces, whilst U.S. companies reap benefits in licensing technology, 
financing, consulting engineering, and equipment sales. 
So, the characterisation of renewable energy as a race, distracts from the benefits that 
could be obtained from cooperation, which is why it is damaging for the U.S. to 
narrowly define RE in terms of national interest and a race for job creation. Co-
operation has long been a feature of the way other countries such as Japan, Korea, and 
Europe interact with China on renewable energy (Bacani 2009), and when energy 
security and climate change are viewed as global problems, they lend themselves to 
global solutions. The Energy Technology Innovation Policy Group at Harvard University 
puts it like this,  
“International cooperation in energy R&D is an essential component of a 
successful energy innovation strategy because most of the problems and 
opportunities of energy systems, such as climate change, nuclear proliferation,  
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and the economic and security benefits of providing modern energy for the 
poorest one third of humanity, are inherently global, and because international 
cooperation allows for the sharing of costs and risks of the innovation process.” 
(Gallagher 2009)  
Unfortunately it is not as simple as that, as there is a level of mutual suspicion and 
mistrust between China and the U.S., based on broader geo-political issues, as we will 
explore in the following section. 
4.4  THE BROADER GEO-POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Pulitzer Prize winning author Thomas Friedman alluded to the wider significance of 
renewable energy when he commented that, “China going green is the 21st century 
equivalent of the Soviet Union’s 1957 launch of Sputnik” (Ramzy 2009). Exploring that 
analogy for a moment - the space program went hand in glove with development of 
military missiles, and the country that could dominate space literally gained the 
strategic high ground. Also, being the first to land a man on the moon was significant 
for another reason, an ideological one - it was the great technological challenge of the 
era, and the country who won proved that its political, economic and social systems 
were superior, to an eagerly watching world (Inslee and Hendricks 2008). 
In the 21st century, renewable energy is of similar strategic and ideological importance. 
Energy is essential to fuel economic growth and military power, and the U.S. has built 
its economic dominance by mastering the resources and technology of fossil fuels, but 
fears, “... the fossil fuel fed industrial era is ending and that the leading power of that 
age, the US, might not be able to maintain its economic dominance” (Bacani 2009). So, 
as we enter the clean energy era it follows that the country who can substitute reliance 
on fossil fuels for a future based on renewable energy will have a strategic advantage. 
President Obama confirmed as much in his State of the Union Address, “The nation that  
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leads the clean-energy economy will be the nation that leads the global economy, and 
America must be that nation” (Harder 2010). 
Meanwhile, Lee reminds us that , “Authoritarian China remains a deeply insecure 
power existing in an American-dominated liberal system, and firmly sees America as a 
strategic competitor.” (Lee 2008). A key area of contention between the two is fossil 
fuel supplies. China was self sufficient in energy for centuries, and even as recently as 
the 1980s could supply 94% of its energy needs from within its own borders (Ma, Oxley 
et al. 2009). Now it is a net importer of oil from Africa and the Mid-East, and gas and 
coal from Australia and Vietnam, and is building a blue water navy to protect its supply 
bottlenecks in the Taiwan and Malacca straights (Berrah, Feng et al. 2007). As China 
looks outwards to satisfy its growing demand for fossil fuels, this inevitably brings it 
into competition, and maybe even conflict, with other states chasing finite world 
supplies. Already it has been blamed for driving oil prices up (International Energy 
Agency 2010), and its support of states like Sudan, Nigeria, and Iran in return for access 
to their oil has pitted it against western countries on the world political stage, who 
consider them to be “rogue” states (Zha Daojiong 2005).  So renewable energy is of 
great strategic importance for China, as the more it can rely on indigenous supplies for 
energy, the less it needs to project itself into the international arena, and the safer we 
can all feel. 
Renewable energy also has a wider significance – it is the technological, economic and 
moral challenge of our time, and as with the space race, the economic/political system 
that can deliver will be shown to be the superior model in the eyes of the watching 
world. In essence it pitches America’s brand of ‘democratic capitalism’ against China’s 
ideology of ‘market socialism’. To appreciate the significance of this to the Chinese, we 
need to remember that, “China had dominated the world economy for at least a 
thousand years before the West’s rise” (Hsiung 2002). In eighteen of the last twenty  
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centuries it was the largest economy, a position it didn’t lose until as recently as 1885 – 
fig.34. During this time it had enormous influence in culture, innovation, governance, 
and philosophy; and a navy that ranged far and wide under Admiral Zheng He. 
Moreover, while the U.S. sees itself as a leader in innovation and technology, China can 
claim a long history of inventions such as gunpowder, the magnetic compass, and 
moveable type printing; has the only true system of sustainable agriculture, it having 
survived since the Song Dynasty in AD 1127 (Naughton 2007); and was even using a 
basic form of concentrating solar power to dry crops two thousand years ago (SNEC 
2010) 
 
Fig. 34 US, China and India share of World GDP. (Maddison 2003) 
In fact, both China and the U.S. define their place in the world in very similar ways, as 
pointed out by John Lee (2008) , “They both feel strongly about their moral rectitude, 
both feel their respective cultures and values have something unique and invaluable to 
offer the world, and both believe that they are destined to become truly great powers in 
human history”. Hsiung (2002) believes this will inevitably bring them into 
competition, or as he puts it, China will have a rear end collision with the U.S.. However, 
China is not yet strong enough to challenge the U.S. directly, and has learnt the lessons  
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in its own history, and in the mistakes of others like Japan, Germany and Russia, who 
grew too quickly and challenged the reigning superpower only to be defeated (Lee 
2009). Also, China and America’s economies are more interlinked than any two 
superpowers in modern history, so trade wars would amount to economic suicide. So 
instead they test and probe each other, at times cooperating and at others competing, 
all the time slowly learning about their opponent’s strengths and weaknesses. Nye tells 
us that both China and America are experts in wielding ‘soft power’ which he defines as, 
“... the ability to shape the preferences of others, to get what you want through 
attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a 
country’s culture, political ideas, and policies.” (Joseph Nye, quoted in Lee (2008)). 
China’s success in RE is giving it a great deal of ‘soft power’ at the moment. 
So we can now understand why some in America have chosen to characterise 
renewable energy as a race. It’s not just about the number of wind turbines or green 
jobs, but an allegory for that larger competition, between two superpowers, just like 
the space race was. 
“It is quite possible that this new decade will decide whether the 21st century 
will be China’s century, in the way the 20th century was America’s. Nothing will 
be more central to that determination than the race to create the infrastructure 
for a clean energy future.” (Schwartz 2010) 
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5  CONCLUSION 
“The future of the global climate may rest in large measure on China’s ability to 
lead the world into the age of renewable energy, much as the United States led the 
world into the age of oil roughly a century ago.”  (Christopher Flavin, President of 
the Worldwatch Institute, in (Martinot and Li 2007)) 
5.1  THE RENEWABLE ENERGY RACE 
If we accept the premise we started with, that renewable energy is a race between 
China and the U.S., then the evidence presented in this report supports the conclusion 
that China is indeed winning. In manufacturing, which is the major focus of America’s 
politicians at the moment, as it is where RE can potentially be a buffer from the worst 
effects of the GFC, China has been able to leverage its comparative advantages to 
dominate worldwide production of renewable energy equipment. This gives credence 
to U.S. politicians’ concerns that measures to increase the use of renewables in the US 
will simply benefit manufacturing industry and jobs in China. 
The use of renewables is a little more complex. In simple terms China has double the 
proportion of renewables in its energy mix than the US, but much of that is due to 
traditional forms such as biomass and hydroelectricity. America has greater diversity, 
and leads in deployment of the more advanced technologies like wind power, PV, 
biofuels, and the emerging 3rd generation technologies. However, when we look at the 
trends over time, it seems unlikely the U.S. will maintain this advantage as China’s 
growth rate is much greater, and the U.S. is failing to put in place the long term support 
and policies required to protect its position. 
However, there remain a number of issues for China. Despite recent advances, it is by 
no means certain that China will be able to successfully transition from heavy industry  
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and manufacturing to the innovation and technology economy it needs in order to 
sustain economic growth, while reining in energy intensity and pollution. This requires 
cultural change towards innovation and market forces, and these aren’t the forte of the 
current authoritarian political regime. Next, spectacular though its progress in 
renewable energy is, it can only be a small part of the solution for the world’s biggest 
consumer of energy and producer of carbon pollution. China will also have to master 
energy efficiency, clean coal, and nuclear power, and even then it will still probably be a 
growing presence in global energy markets, with the risk of conflict that brings. But 
perhaps the greatest challenge will be to overcome its isolationist tendencies and 
accept its reliance and interdependence on the rest of the world to solve what are now 
global issues of energy security, fossil fuel dependence, and climate change.  
Meanwhile, it would seem necessary for the U.S. to move past its current fixation on 
renewable energy as a competition with China for green jobs, and instead explore the 
benefits of deploying the current technologies at a large scale, and cooperating with 
China in the development of new technologies for the future benefit of everyone. This 
plays to each country’s comparative advantages, whilst bringing the U.S. the immediate 
benefits of energy security, lower GHG emissions, and those green jobs that come from 
installation and use rather than manufacturing. However, doing this requires 
acceptance of two unpalatable truths. The first is that renewable energy requires a 
greater role for government, not the markets; and the second is that China is the 
economically efficient place for renewable energy technology to be manufactured. The 
former seems likely to remain an obstacle, as recent gains by the ‘Tea Party’ movement 
in U.S. mid-term elections makes it unlikely we’ll see a return to ‘big government’ any 
time soon. Accepting the latter would require a fundamental re-appraisal of America’s 
trading relationship with China, and as Stiglitz (2010) points out, “Most American’s 
don’t understand the principles of comparative advantage ... and if China is 
outcompeting the United States, they believe it has to be because they are doing  
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something unfairly: manipulating exchange rates, subsidising their products, or 
dumping.”   
So, despite the bold rhetoric and good intentions of the new U.S. administration in 
relation to renewable energy, they are instead falling back on historical capabilities in 
fossil fuels and nuclear power.  Already, the Obama administration has announced an 
expansion of offshore oil and gas drilling (Broder 2010), and the first new nuclear 
reactor to be built in the U.S. for 30 years (Time Magazine 2010). Unfortunately, 
without the engagement and commitment of the world’s largest economy and reigning 
superpower – the U.S.; and with the continuing isolationist tendencies of the world’s 
largest energy user and GHG emitter – China; it will be very difficult for the rest of the 
world to move forwards on the critical issues of energy security and climate change.  
In the course of this dissertation I have argued that the characterisation of renewable 
energy as a race has not been useful, and even incorrect. However, in so far as it is a 
proxy for the greater strategic and ideological struggle between the reigning hegemon, 
and the up and coming challenger, then representing it as a competition is entirely 
valid. Moreover, if China surging ahead in renewable energy enables the rest of the 
world to adopt it more quickly and cheaply than it otherwise would have, and at the 
same time jolts the U.S. into action in the same way the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik 
did, then I submit that China winning the renewable energy race can only be a good 
thing. 
5.2  FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this dissertation we’ve seen that China has comparative advantage in manufacturing 
renewable energy technology. However, it is a complex situation, and there are 
undoubtedly opportunities for other countries to carve out a niche in certain industries 
based on their own comparative advantages. I also alluded to a number of areas of  
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potential cooperation, where China could benefit from the involvement and expertise of 
other countries. It would be interesting to delve further into these topics, and highlight 
the potential areas of cooperation and competition that the U.S., and other countries 
could take advantage of. 
Secondly, it would be interesting to apply what we’ve learnt about the success (or 
otherwise) of China and America’s renewable energy strategies, to other countries. For 
example, there are certain parallels between India’s situation and China’s – populous 
developing nations, with rising standards of living and energy needs, but currently 
reliant on polluting fossil fuels. Can India learn any lessons from China’s path? There 
are also similarities between America and Australia - high per capita energy use, 
strength in fossil fuels, little government action on renewable energy. What lessons can 
Australia learn from China and America’s different approaches to renewable energy?  
5.3  EFFECTIVENESS OF RESEARCH APPROACH 
I am unaware of any other research that has approached this topic within the context of 
the popular characterisation of it as a race. Studying it in this way has proved useful 
because it reminds us that conclusions about success or failure cannot just be based on 
statistics about exports, GW of installed capacity, or dollars of investment, but need to 
be studied in the context of political strategy, public perceptions, and wider geo-
political ambitions. SWOT analysis proved to be a useful tool for this, as it can 
encompass the broad range of numerical, economic, and political factors required in 
this study, and condense them into a simple form to aid comparisons and drawing of 
conclusions. 
Overall I have achieved my objectives of getting behind the hyperbole and discovering 
the true facts about who is winning, and why. There are, however, a number of 
limitations that need to be recognised. Although I have tried to put the study on as  
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objective a basis as possible by using a logical approach, credible references to guide 
my analysis, and numbers and observations to back up my conclusions, because of the 
nature of the topic it does remain somewhat subjective. Secondly, because of time and 
space limitations, it has been necessary to confine my study to the interactions of just 
two countries, whereas in reality it is a much more complex picture of multiple players. 
Finally, as with any subject of topical importance, and especially one in an area as 
dynamic as renewable energy, things are constantly changing, and although I have used 
the most up to date information available, my conclusions should be looked at in the 
context of unfolding events. 
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7  APPENDICES 
7.1  SWOT ANALYSIS 
SWOT analysis was developed by Albert Humphrey at Stanford in the 1970s as a result 
of a study of the strategic planning of Fortune 500 companies. It is, “A subjective 
assessment of data which is organised by the SWOT format into a logical order that 
helps understanding, presentation, discussion, and decision making” 
(Businessballs.com 2010). 
•  Step 1 - identify a strategic goal, in this case to win the renewable energy race. 
Without the results of a SWOT analysis being directed towards a specific goal, it 
becomes much less useful in identifying actions that are to be taken 
•  Step 2 -  PEST analysis, to identify all the Political, Economic, Social, and 
Technological factors relevant to the goal 
•  Step 3 – arrange into Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. I have 
defined S&W as current attributes/capabilities in RE, and O&T factors external 
to the RE industry 
•  Step 4 – identify actions 
–  Strengths – maintain, build and leverage 
–  Opportunities – Prioritise and optimise 
–  Weaknesses – remedy or exit 
–  Threats – counter 
–  Matching exercise: Identify competitive advantages by matching 
strengths to opportunities  
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–  Conversion exercise: Take weaknesses or threats and convert them into 
strengths or opportunities 
•  Step 5 – incorporate actions identified in the SWOT analysis into business 
strategy 
Thus the SWOT analysis allows a more logical and systematic analysis of the factors 
affecting a particular country, and formulation of a strategy to take forwards. 
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7.2  SOURCES OF ENERGY SUPPLY DATA 
No one source was able to provide a complete breakdown of China and America’s 
renewable energy capacities, so I had to combine a number of sources. Moreover, it was 
necessary to find data as recent as possible (2009) and to convert to common units 
(GW) in order to construct the charts in fig. 5. 
China & U.S. Renewable Energy Capacity 2009 
Technology  Capacity 
(GW) 
Capacity 
(%TPES) 
Source of data 
China  U.S.  China  U.S.  China  U.S. 
Sml. Hydro.  33  3  0.673
1 
0,006  (REN21 2009)  (U.S. Energy 
Information 
Administration 2009) 
Lge. Hydro.  164  92  3.302  1.86  (Martinot and Li 
2007; REN21 
2009) 
(U.S. Energy 
Information 
Administration 2009; 
REN21 2010) 
Wind  25.8  35.1  0.520
7 
0.71  (REN21 2010)  (U.S. Energy 
Information 
Administration 2009; 
REN21 2010) 
PV  0.4  1.2  0.008  0.025  (REN21 2009; 
REN21 2010) 
(REN21 2010) 
Biomass 
Pwr. 
3.2  9  0.063
5 
0.18  (REN21 2010)  (U.S. Energy 
Information 
Administration 2009) 
Solar 
Therm. Pwr. 
0  0.5  0  0.01  (REN21 2010)  (REN21 2010) 
Geothermal  0  3.2  0  0.065  (REN21 2010)  (U.S. Energy 
Information 
Administration 2009; 
REN21 2010) 
Biofuels  1.97  32.2
3 
0.038
1 
0.65  (REN21 2010)  (U.S. Energy 
Information 
Administration 2009; 
REN21 2010) 
Solar HW  134  2  2.705
1 
0.04  (Li and Ma 2009; 
REN21 2009; 
REN21 2010) 
(REN21 2010) 
Trad. 
Biomass 
266  69  5.384
8 
1.395  (REN21 2010)  (U.S. Energy 
Information 
Administration 2009) 
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7.3  DEFINITION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY GENERATIONS 
1st Generation Renewables – Hydropower, Biomass Combustion, Geothermal 
2nd Generation Renewables – Solar heating and cooling, Wind, Solar PV, 1st gen Biofuels 
3rd Generation Renewables – Concentrating Solar Power, Ocean Energy, Enhanced 
Geothermal Systems, Advanced Biofuels. 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA 2007) 
 